Taiwan's commonsense consensus 台灣對於中國的經濟整合的共識和常識

this article is translated from the link below.
http://www.economist.com/node/18229208

Original Article

Banyan

Taiwan's commonsense consensus

Economic integration with China is not doing what China hoped and the opposition feared

Feb 24th 2011 | from the print edition 

TWO elderly men in baseball caps have been touring Taipei’s government district this week with a loud-hailer. The slogans they shout are plastered over their battered little van: “Warmly welcome Chen Yunlin and the inauguration of the Economic Co-operation Committee!” It is not catchy, and nobody pays a blind bit of notice. Their excitement about two of the latest signs of Taiwan’s burgeoning ties with China is not widely shared.
Mr Chen is a Chinese official who has been leading negotiations with Taiwan. Since Ma Ying-jeou was elected Taiwan’s president in 2008, these have led to 15 cross-strait agreements, including last year’s “ECFA” (Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement)—a free-trade agreement in embryo. Mr Chen arrived in Taiwan on February 23rd with a group of businessmen, scouting investment opportunities. The day before, an Economic Co-operation Committee (ECC), a joint China-Taiwan body to oversee implementation of the ECFA, met for the first time.

All this is par for the course these days. Exchanges between the two sides have been booming for over 20 years. China and Hong Kong take more than 40% of Taiwan’s exports; its businesses have at least $90 billion invested in the mainland, where some 800,000 Taiwanese live. And the past couple of years have seen a remarkable acceleration in exchanges. Besides Mr Chen and the ECC members, 400 Chinese travel agents arrived on February 22nd. The previous week saw the mayor of Nanjing fly in with 100 people in tow, and the governor of Liaoning province with 800. Regular direct flights began only in July 2008. Yet last year 1.6m Chinese tourists visited.

For both Mr Ma’s Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Chinese Communist Party, this is a deliberate political strategy. The KMT hopes to show voters the benefits of better ties with China, after the fraught eight-year presidency of Chen Shui-bian, of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which believes Taiwan is independent of China.
Taiwan’s economy grew by over 10% in 2010, when Taiwan recorded a surplus on bilateral trade of more than $70 billion with China and Hong Kong. China hopes economic interdependence will win hearts and minds. This will keep the more congenial KMT in power. And it will bring closer the day when Taiwan’s people fall willingly back, as China sees it, into the warm embrace of the motherland and “reunify”.
This cunning plan does not seem to be working. In local elections in November, the DPP won more votes than the KMT. Despite being trounced in the presidential election in 2008, and seeing its former leader, Mr Chen, jailed for corruption, the DPP now has a realistic chance of winning back the presidency next year. And in polls on Taiwan’s future reported by the government’s Mainland Affairs Council, support for unification “as soon as possible” is as low as it has ever been, at 1.2%. Even the numbers wanting “status quo now/unification later” have fallen from 10.5% to 7.1% since the 2008 election. In the same period, support for independence, now or later, has inched up from 23.1% to 24%.
Perhaps this is not so surprising. Taiwan has long behaved as a normal country in almost everything except its dealings with its large neighbour. As those become easier, the status quo seems even more desirable. And increased contact highlights points of difference as much as a shared ethnic and cultural heritage. Knowing China better makes Taiwanese even more aware of how lucky they are to be prosperous and free.
So Mr Ma has to balance his economic romance with China with political aloofness. In response to the upheavals in the Middle East, he has called for reform in China. He keeps asking America to sell Taiwan new fighter jets. This week he berated an envoy from the Philippines, with which Taiwan is furious for deporting Taiwan citizens accused of fraud to China.
Perversely, the traditionally “pro-independence” DPP is better placed to profit from the heightened sense of a distinct Taiwanese identity that increased contacts are spawning. But it too faces a dilemma. People undoubtedly do like the economic benefits of co-operation with China. The KMT has negotiated them under a weird formula known as the “1992 consensus”, in which China and Taiwan sit down together agreeing there is only “one China”, while keeping silent about what that means.
The DPP rejects this. The rival contenders for its presidential candidacy next year are competing to come up with other “consensuses” to propose as a substitute. They know that to be a credible party of government again, they have to be able to deal with China. As one supporter puts it, “that’s not a consensus, it’s common sense.” So this week the DPP launched a think-tank intended both to devise a workable China policy and to act as a channel for cross-strait talks. China seems ready to give the DPP a chance. The trip by Chen Yunlin, the senior Chinese negotiator, includes a foray into the party’s heartlands in the south of the island. The DPP itself is for once not to stage any protests against his visit, though doubtless plenty of citizens will.
Make me free or Chinese. But not yet
The KMT likes to portray the DPP as dangerous hotheads who might force China to carry out its threat of invasion if Taiwan declares independence. The DPP paints the KMT as a party of Chinese stooges leading Taiwan blindfold towards absorption by the mainland. In fact, the two parties are having a more sophisticated argument: not about independence or unification, but about how best to preserve a status quo most people in Taiwan cherish. The danger is how China might react as it becomes clear that present policies are bringing unification no closer. The hope is that, with so much else to preoccupy it, its leaders will enjoy the smoother relations and not ask where they are leading.

 <中文譯文>
民國一百年二月二十四日
和中國經濟整體化並沒有達到中國的理想目標也沒有走向台灣所畏懼的方向

這整週，兩位老人在棒球帽的男子佩戴擴音器在台北市巡迴。他們的口號貼滿小麵包車：“熱烈歡迎陳雲林，就職經濟合作委員會！“這不吸引人，沒有人注意。對於最近台灣蓬勃發展與中國的關係是沒有得到廣泛的共享。

陳先生是一個中國官員，他主導與台灣談判。自從馬英九當選台灣總統，2008年，這些都導致了15項兩岸協議，包括去年的“ECFA“（Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement，經濟合作框架協議），這是一個自由貿易協議的雛型。2月23日，陳先生抵達台灣與一群商人，尋找的投資機會。前一天，經濟合作委員會（ECC, Economic Co-operation Committee），舉行了第一次會議。ECC是 中國台灣合作機構, 任務是監督執行ECFA。
這幾天發生的事件都是意料之中。雙方之間的交流蓬勃發展已超過20年。台灣出口超過40％到中國和香港，它的業務至少有九佰億美元在大陸投資，其中約 80萬台灣人居住。過去幾年的交流加速顯著。除了陳先生和該委員會的成員，在2月22日，中國旅行社400位代表也抵達台灣。前一周南京市長和100位陸客來訪，而遼寧省省長也攜帶800位陸客來台。定期直航2008年7月才開始。僅僅去年就有160萬中國遊客到訪。

對於國民黨和共產黨，這是一種蓄意的政治策略。國民黨希望讓選民了解與中國友好的利益，大於陳水扁八年執政堅持台灣獨立於中國的政策。

2010年，台灣的經濟增長超過10％，對中國和香港雙邊貿易台灣盈餘超過 700億美元。中國希望經濟上的相互依賴將贏得人心。這將保持國民黨執政。中國認為這將進一步推進台灣人民意願回歸，和祖國“統一“。


這種巧妙的計劃似乎並不奏效。在11月地方選舉，民進黨贏得比國民黨更多選票。儘管民進黨在2008年總統選舉中被擊敗，它的前領導人，陳先生，因腐敗被判入獄，民進黨現在有一個實值的機會贏得明年的總統大選。而在陸委會調查台灣未來報告中，支持“盡快”統一跌到史上最低1.2％。自2008年大選後，即使是"現在維持現狀 /最終統一"已經從 10.5％降至7.1％，。而支持獨立，不論現在或以後，已經從 23.1％微升至24％。 

這並不奇怪。除了和中國打交道之外，台灣運作長久以來和正常國家運作幾乎無異。由於現在和中國打交道變得更容易，現狀似乎比以往更順利。密切和中國接觸突顯出差異點多於民族和文化遺產。更加了解中國，使台灣人更知道他們是多麼幸運，繁榮和自由。 因此，馬英九已平衡他的對中國經濟與政治立場。為了應對動盪的中東地區，他呼籲中國改革。他一直要求美國向台灣出售新的戰鬥機。這個星期，他罵了來自菲律賓的特使，與台灣是為驅逐台灣民眾憤怒指責中國的欺詐。 <to be continued>